We construct noninteractive statistical zero-knowledge (NISZK) proof systems for a variety of standard approximation problems on lattices, such as the shortest independent vectors problem and the complement of the shortest vector problem. Prior proof systems for lattice problems were either interactive or leaked knowledge (or both).
Introduction
A central idea in computer science is an interactive proof system, which allows a (possibly unbounded) prover to convince a computationally-limited verifier that a given statement is true [Bab85, GMR89, GS86] . The beautiful notion of zero knowledge, introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR89] , even allows the prover to convince the verifier while revealing nothing more than the truth of the statement.
Many of the well-known results about zero knowledge, e.g., that NP (and even all of IP) has zero-knowledge proofs [GMW91, BGG + 88], refer to computational zero knowledge, where security holds only against a bounded cheating verifier (typically under some complexity assumption). Yet there has also been a rich line of research concerning proof 1 systems in which the zero-knowledge property is statistical. The advantages of such systems include security against even unbounded cheating verifiers, usually without any need for unproved assumptions. Much is now known about the class SZK of problems possessing statistical zero-knowledge proofs; for example, it does not contain NP unless the polynomial-time hierarchy collapses [For87, AH91] , it is closed under complement and union [Oka00] , it has natural complete (promise) problems [SV03, GV99] , and it is insensitive to whether the zero-knowledge condition is defined for arbitrary malicious verifiers, or only for honest ones [GSV98] .
Removing interaction. Zero-knowledge proofs inherently derive their power from interaction [GO94] . In spite of this, Blum, Feldman, and Micali [BFM88] showed how to construct meaningful noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs (consisting of a single message from the prover to the verifier) if the parties simply share access to a uniformly random string. Furthermore, noninteractive computational zero-knowledge proofs exist for all of NP under plausible cryptographic assumptions [BFM88, BDMP91, FLS99, GOS06] .
Just as with interactive proofs (and for the same reasons), it is also interesting to consider noninteractive proofs where the zero-knowledge condition is statistical. Compared with SZK, much less is known about the class NISZK of problems admitting such proofs. Clearly, NISZK is a (possibly proper) subset of SZK. It is also known to have complete (promise) problems [DDPY98, GSV99] , but unlike SZK, it is not known whether NISZK is closed under complement or disjunction (OR). 2 Some conditional results are also known, e.g., NISZK = SZK if and only if NISZK is closed under complement [GSV99] (though it seems far from clear whether this condition is true or not).
Applying NISZK proofs. In cryptographic schemes, the benefits of NISZK proofs are manifold: they involve a minimal number of messages, they remain secure under parallel and concurrent composition, and they provide a very strong level of security against unbounded cheating provers and verifiers alike, typically without relying on any complexity assumptions. However, the only concrete problems of cryptographic utility known to be in NISZK are all related in some way to integer factorization, i.e., variants of quadratic residuosity [BFM88, DDP94, DDP97] and the language of "quasi-safe" prime products [GMR98] . 3 Another important consideration in applying proof systems (both interactive and noninterative) is the complexity of the prover. Generally speaking, it is not enough simply to have a proof system; one also needs to be able to implement the prover efficiently given a suitable witness or auxiliary input. For interactive SZK, several proof systems for specific problems (e.g., those of [GMR89, MV03] ) admit efficient provers, and it was recently shown that every language in SZK ∩ NP has an efficient prover [NV06] . For noninteractive statistical zero knowledge, prover efficiency is not understood so well: while the systems relating to quadratic residuosity [BFM88, DDP94, DDP97] have efficient provers, the language of quasi-safe prime products [GMR98] is known to have an efficient prover only if interaction is allowed in one component of the proof.
Lattices and Proof Systems
Ever since the foundational work of Ajtai [Ajt04] on constructing hard-on-average cryptographic functions from worst-case assumptions relating to lattices, there has been significant interest in characterizing the complexity of lattice problems. Proof systems have provided an excellent means of making progress in this endeavor. We review some recent results below, after introducing the basic notions.
An n-dimensional lattice in R n is a periodic "grid" of points consisting of all integer linear combinations of some set of linearly independent vectors B = {b 1 , . . . , b n } ⊂ R n , called a basis of the lattice. Two of the central computational problems on lattices are the shortest vector problem SVP and the closest vector problem CVP. The goal of SVP is to find a (nonzero) lattice point whose length is minimal, given an arbitrary basis of the lattice. The goal of CVP, given an arbitrary basis and some target point t ∈ R n , is to find a lattice point closest to t. Another problem, whose importance to cryptography was first highlighted in Ajtai's work [Ajt04] , is the shortest independent vectors problem SIVP. Here the goal (given a basis) is to find n linearly independent lattice vectors, the longest of which is as short as possible. All of these problems are known to be NP-complete in the worst case (in the case of SVP, under randomized reductions) [Ajt98, vEB81, BS99] , so we do not expect to obtain NISZK (or even SZK) proof systems for them.
In this work, we are primarily concerned with the natural approximation versions of lattice problems, phrased as promise (or "gap") problems with some approximation factor γ ≥ 1. For example, the goal of GapSVP γ is to accept any basis for which the shortest nonzero lattice vector has length at most 1, and to reject those for which it has length at least γ. One typically views the approximation factor as a function γ(n) of the dimension of the lattice; problems become easier (or at least no harder) for increasing values of γ. Known polynomial-time algorithms for lattice problems obtain approximation factors γ(n) that are only slightly subexponential in n [LLL82, Sch87, AKS01, AKS02]. Moreover, obtaining a γ(n) = poly(n) approximation requires exponential time and space using known algorithms [AKS01, AKS02, BN07]. Therefore, lattice problems appear quite difficult to approximate to within even moderately-large factors.
Proof systems. We now review several proof systems for the above-described lattice problems and their complements. Every known system falls into one of two categories: interactive proofs that generally exhibit some form of statistical zero knowledge, or noninteractive proofs that are not zero knowledge (unless, of course, the associated lattice problems are trivial).
First of all, it is apparent that GapSVP γ , GapCVP γ , and GapSIVP γ have trivial NP proof systems for any γ ≥ 1. (E.g., for GapSVP γ one can simply give a nonzero lattice vector of length at most 1.) Of course, the proofs clearly leak knowledge.
Goldreich and Goldwasser [GG00] initiated the study of interactive proof systems for lattice problems, showing that the complement problems coGapSVP γ and coGapCVP γ have AM proof systems for γ(n) = O( n/ log n) factors. In other words, there are interactive proofs that all nonzero vectors in a given lattice are long, and that a given point in R n is far from a given lattice. 4 Moreover, the protocols are perfect zero knowledge for honest verifiers, but they are not known to have efficient provers. Aharonov and Regev [AR05] showed that for slightly looser γ(n) = O( √ n) factors, the same two problems are even in NP. In other words, for such γ the interactive proofs of [GG00] can be replaced by a noninteractive witness, albeit one that leaks knowledge. Building upon [GG00, AR05], Guruswami, Micciancio, and Regev [GMR05] showed analogous AM and NP proof systems for coGapSIVP γ .
Micciancio and Vadhan [MV03] gave (malicious verifier) SZK proofs with efficient provers for GapSVP γ and GapCVP γ , where γ(n) = O( n/ log n). To our knowledge, there is no known zero-knowledge proof system for the cryptographically important GapSIVP γ problem (even an interactive one), except by a reduction to coGapSVP using so-called "transference theorems" for lattices [Ban93] . This reduction introduces an extra n factor in the approximation, resulting in fairly loose γ(n) = O(n 1.5 / √ log n) factors. The same applies for the covering radius problem GapCRP [GMR05] , where the goal is to estimate the maximum distance from the lattice over all points in R n , and for the GapGSMP problem of approximating the Gram-Schmidt minimum of a lattice.
Our Results
We construct (without any assumption) noninteractive statistical zero-knowledge proof systems for a variety of lattice problems, for reasonably small approximation factors γ(n). These are the first known NISZK proofs for lattice problems, and more generally, for any cryptographically useful problem not related to integer factorization. In addition, they are proofs of knowledge, have reasonable communication and verifier complexity, and admit efficient provers. They also imply the first known interactive statistical zero-knowledge proofs for certain lattice problems. Specifically, we construct the following:
• NISZK proofs (with efficient provers) for the GapSIVP γ , GapCRP γ , and GapGSMP γ problems, for any factor γ(n) = ω( √ n log n). 5
In particular, this implies the first known (even interactive) SZK proof systems for these problems with approximation factors tighter than n 1.5 / √ log n.
• An NISZK proof for coGapSVP γ for any factor γ(n) ≥ 20 √ n. This is essentially the best we could hope for (up to constant factors) given the state of the art, because coGapSVP γ is not even known to be in NP for any factor γ(n) < √ n.
For this proof system, we are able to give an efficient prover for γ(n) = ω(n · √ log n) factors, and an efficient quantum prover for slightly tighter γ(n) = O(n/ √ log n) factors. (The prover's advice and the proof itself are still entirely classical; only the algorithm for generating the proof is quantum.)
• An NISZK proof for a special disjunction problem of two or more coGapSVP γ instances. As we describe in more detail below, this system may serve as an important ingredient in an eventual construction of noninteractive (computational) zero knowledge proofs for all of NP under lattice-related assumptions.
Our systems are also proofs of knowledge of a full-rank set of relatively "short" vectors in the given lattice. This is an important property in some of the applications to lattice-based cryptography we envision, described next.
Applications.
Public key infrastructure. It is widely recognized that in public-key infrastructures, a user who presents her public key to a certification authority should also prove knowledge of a corresponding 5 Recall that a function g(n) = ω(f (n)) if g(n) grows faster than c · f (n) for every constant c > 0.
secret key (lest she present an "invalid" key, or one that actually belongs to some other user). A recent work of Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [GPV08] constructed a variety of cryptographic schemes (including "hash-and-sign" signatures and identity-based encryption) in which the secret key can be any full-rank set of suitably "short" vectors in a public lattice. Our NISZK proof systems provide a reasonably efficient and statistically-secure way to prove knowledge of such secret keys. Implementing this idea requires some care, however, due to the exact nature of the knowledge guarantee and the fact that we are dealing with proof systems for promise problems.
To be more specific, a user generates a public key containing some basis B of a lattice Λ, and acts as the prover in the GapSIVP γ system for (say) γ ≈ √ n. In order to satisfy the completeness hypothesis, an honest user needs to generate B along with a full-rank set of lattice vectors all having length at most ≈ 1. The statistical zero-knowledge condition ensures that nothing about the user's secret key is leaked to the authority. Now consider a potentially malicious user. By the soundness condition, we are guaranteed only that Λ contains a full-rank set of lattice vectors all of length at most γ (otherwise the user will not be able to give a convincing proof). Under this guarantee, our knowledge extractor is able to extract a full-rank set of lattice vectors of somewhat larger length ≈ γ · √ n ≈ n. Therefore, the extracted secret key vectors may be somewhat longer than the honestly-generated ones. Fortunately, the schemes of [GPV08] are parameterized by a value L, so that they behave identically on any secret key consisting of vectors of length at most L. Letting L be a bound on the length of the extracted vectors ensures that the proof of knowledge is useful in the broader context, e.g., to a simulator that needs to generate valid signatures under the presented public key. We also remark that our NISZK proofs can be made more compact in size when applied to the hard-on-average integer lattices used in [GPV08] and related works, by dealing only with integer vectors rather than high-precision real vectors.
NICZK for all of NP? Our proof systems may also be useful in constructing noninteractive computational zero-knowledge proof systems for all of NP based on the hardness of lattice problems. We outline a direction that follows the general approach of Blum, De Santis, Micali, and Persiano [BDMP91] , who constructed an NICZK for the NP-complete language 3SAT under the quadratic residuosity assumption.
In [BDMP91] , the common input is a 3SAT formula, and the auxiliary input to the prover is a satisfying assignment. The prover first chooses N , a product of two distinct primes. He associates, in a certain way, each true literal with a quadratic nonresidue from Z * N , and each false literal with a quadratic residue. He proves in zero knowledge that (a) for each variable, either it or its negation is associated with a quadratic residue (thus, a variable and its negation cannot both be assigned true), and (b) for each clause, at least one of its three literals is associated with a quadratic nonresidue (thus, each clause is true under the implicit truth assignment). Thus, the entire proof involves zero-knowledge proofs of a disjunction of quadratic residuosity instances (for case (a)) and a disjunction of quadratic nonresiduosity instances (for case (b)).
We can replicate much of the above structure using lattices. Briefly, the modulus N translates to a suitably-chosen lattice Λ having large minimum distance, a quadratic nonresidue translates to a superlattice Λ i of Λ also having large minimum distance, and a quadratic residue translates to a superlattice having small minimum distance. It then suffices to show in zero knowledge that (a) for each variable, the lattice associated to either it or its negation (or both) has small minimum distance, and (b) for each clause, the lattice associated to one of the variables in the clause has large minimum distance. In Section 3.5, we show how to implement part (b) by constructing an NISZK proof for a special disjunction of coGapSVP instances. However, we do not know how to prove noninteractively that one or more lattices has small minimum distance, i.e., a disjunction of GapSVP instances (see Section 1.3 for discussion). This seems to be the main technical barrier for obtaining NICZK for all of NP under lattice assumptions.
Finally, our NISZK proofs immediately imply statistically-secure zaps, as defined by Dwork and Naor [DN00] , for the same problems. Zaps have a number of applications in general, and we suspect that they may find equally important applications in lattice-based cryptography.
Techniques.
The main conceptual tool for achieving zero knowledge in our proof systems is a lattice quantity called the smoothing parameter, introduced by Micciancio and Regev [MR07] (following related work of Regev [Reg04] ). The smoothing parameter was introduced for the purpose of obtaining worst-case to average-case reductions for lattice problems, but more generally, it provides a way to generate an (almost-)uniform random variable related to an arbitrary given lattice.
In more detail, let Λ ⊂ R n be a lattice, and imagine "blurring" all the points of Λ according to a Gaussian distribution. With enough blur, the discrete structure of the lattice is entirely destroyed, and the resulting picture is (almost) uniformly-spread over R n . Technically, this intuitive description corresponds to choosing a noise vector e from a Gaussian distribution (centered at the origin) and reducing e modulo any basis B of the lattice. (The value e mod B is the unique point
it can be computed efficiently given e and B.) Informally, the smoothing parameter of the lattice is the amount of noise needed to obtain a nearly uniform distribution over P(B) via this process.
Overview of our proof systems. Our NISZK proofs all share a common structure regardless of the specific lattice problem in question. It is actually most instructive to first consider the zero-knowledge simulator, and then build the prover and verifier around it. In fact, we have already described how the simulator works: given a basis B, it simply chooses a Gaussian noise vector e and computes t = e mod B. The vector t ∈ P(B) is the simulated common random "string," and e is the simulated proof. 6 In the real proof system, the random string is a uniformly random t ∈ P(B), and the prover (suppose for now that it is unbounded) generates a proof e by sampling from the Gaussian distribution conditioned on the event e = t mod B. The verifier simply checks that indeed t − e ∈ Λ and that e is "short enough."
For statistical zero knowledge, suppose that YES instances of the lattice problem have small smoothing parameter. Then the simulated random string t = e mod B is (nearly) uniform, just as t is in the real system; moreover, the distribution of the simulated proof e conditioned on t is the exactly the same as the distribution of the real proof e. For completeness, we use the fact (proved in [MR07] ) that a real proof e generated in the specified way is indeed relatively short. Finally, for soundness, we require that in NO instances, a significant fraction of random strings t ∈ P(B) are simply too far away from the lattice to admit any short enough proof e. (The soundness error can of course be attentuated by composing several independent proofs in parallel.)
The two competing requirements for YES and NO instances (for zero knowledge and soundness, respectively) determine the resulting approximation factor for the particular lattice problem. For the GapSIVP, GapCRP, and GapGSMP problems, the factor is ≈ √ n, but for technical reasons it turns out to be only ≈ n for the coGapSVP problem. To obtain tighter O( √ n) factors, we design a system that can be seen as a zero-knowledge analogue of the NP proof system of Aharonov and Regev [AR05] . Our prover simply gives many independent proofs e i (as above) in parallel, for uniform and independent t i ∈ P(B). The verifier, rather than simply checking the lengths of the individual e i s, instead performs an "eigenvalue test" on the entire collection. Although the eigenvalue test and its purpose (soundness) are exactly the same as in [AR05] , we use it in a technically different way: whereas in [AR05] it bounds a certain quantity computed by the verifier (which leaks knowledge, but guarantees rejection), here it bounds the volume of "bad" random strings that could potentially allow for false proofs.
We now turn to the issue of prover efficiency. Recall that the prover must choose a Gaussian noise vector e conditioned on the event that e = t mod B. Such conditional distributions, called discrete Gaussians over lattices, have played a key role in several recent results in complexity theory and cryptography, e.g., [AR05, MR07, Reg05, Pei08] . The recent work of [GPV08] demonstrated an algorithm that can use any suitably "short" basis of the lattice as advice for efficiently sampling from a discrete Gaussian. Applying this algorithm immediately yields efficient provers for the tightest γ(n) = ω( √ n log n) factors for GapSIVP and related problems, and γ(n) = ω(n · √ log n) factors for coGapSVP. In this work, we also describe a quantum sampling algorithm (using different advice) that yields an efficient quantum prover for coGapSVP, for slightly tighter
Finally, we add that all of our proof systems easily generalize to arbitrary p norms for p ≥ 2, under essentially the same approximation factors γ(n). The proof systems themselves actually remain exactly the same; their analysis in p norms relies upon general facts about discrete Gaussians due to Peikert [Pei08] .
Open Questions
Recall that SZK is closed under complement and union [Oka00] and that every langauge in SZK ∩ NP has a statistical zero-knowledge proof with an efficient prover [NV06] . Whether NISZK has analogous properties is a difficult open problem with many potential consequences. Our work raises versions of these questions for several specific problems, which may help to shed some light on the general case.
We have shown that coGapSVP γ has NISZK proofs for certain γ(n) = poly(n) factors; does its complement GapSVP γ have such proofs as well? As described above, we suspect that a positive answer to this question, combined with our proofs for the special coGapSVP disjunction problem, could lead to noninteractive (computational) zero knowledge proofs for all of NP under worst-case lattice assumptions. In addition, because the closest vector problem GapCVP and its complement coGapCVP both admit SZK proofs, it is an interesting question whether they also admit NISZK proofs. The chief technical difficulty in addressing any of these questions seems to be that a short (or close) lattice vector guarantees nothing useful about the smoothing parameter of the lattice (or its dual). Therefore it is unclear how the simulator could generate a uniformly random string together with a meaningful proof.
The factors γ(n) for which we can demonstrate efficient provers are in some cases looser than those for which we know of inefficient provers. The gap between these factors is solely a consequence of our limited ability to sample from discrete Gaussians. Is there some succinct (possibly quantum) advice that permits efficient sampling from a discrete Gaussian with a parameter close to the smoothing parameter of the lattice (or close to the tightest known bound on the smoothing parameter)? More generally, does every problem in NISZK ∩ NP have an NISZK proof with an efficient prover?
Finally, although we construct an NISZK proof for a problem that is structurally similar to the disjunction (OR) of many coGapSVP instances, there are additional technical constraints on the problem. It would be interesting to see if these constraints could be relaxed or lifted entirely.
Preliminaries 2.1 Notation
For any positive integer n, [n] denotes the set {1, . . . , n}. The function log always denotes the natural logarithm. We extend any function f (·) to a countable set A in the following way: f (A) = x∈A f (x). A positive function (·) is negligible in its parameter if it decreases faster than the inverse of any polynomial, i.e., if (n) = n −ω(1) . The statistical distance between two distributions X and Y over a countable set A is ∆(X, Y ) = 1 2
Vectors are written using bold lower-case letters, e.g., x. Matrices are written using bold capital letters, e.g., X. The ith column vector of X is denoted x i . We often use matrix notation to denote a set of vectors, i.e., S also represents the set of its column vectors. We write span(v 1 , v 2 , . . .) to denote the linear space spanned by its arguments. For a set S ⊆ R n , v ∈ R n , and c ∈ R, we let S + x = {y + x : y ∈ S} and cS = {cy : y ∈ S}.
The symbol · denotes the Euclidean norm on R n . We say that the norm of a set of vectors is the norm of its longest element: X = max i x i . For any t ∈ R n and set V ⊆ R n , the distance from t to V is dist(t, V ) = inf v∈V dist(t, v).
Noninteractive Proof Systems
We consider proof systems for promise problems Π = (Π YES , Π NO ) where each instance of the problem is associated with some value of the security parameter n, and we partition the instances into sets Π YES n and Π NO n in the natural way. In general, the value of n might be different from the length of the instance; for example, the natural security parameter for lattice problems is the dimension n of the lattice, but the input basis might be represented using many more bits. In this work, we assume for simplicity that instances of lattice problems have lengths bounded by some fixed polynomial in the dimension n, and we treat n as the natural security parameter.
Definition 2.1 (Noninteractive Proof System). A pair (P, V ) is a noninteractive proof system for a promise problem Π = (Π YES , Π NO ) if P is a (possibly unbounded) probabilistic algorithm, V is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm, and the following conditions hold for some functions c(n), s(n) : N → [0, 1] and for all n ∈ N:
• Soundness:
The probabilities are taken over the choice of the random input r and the random choices of P . The function c(n) is called the completeness error, and the function s(n) is called the soundness error. For nontriviality, we require c(n) + s(n) ≤ 1 − 1/poly(n).
The random input r is generally chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1} p(n) for some fixed polynomial p(·). For notiational simplicity, we adopt a model in which the random input r is chosen from an efficiently-sampleable set R x that may depend on the instance x. This is without loss of generality, because given a random string r ∈ {0, 1} p(n) , both prover and verifier can generate r ∈ R x simply by running the sampling algorithm with randomness r .
By standard techniques, completeness and soundness errors can be reduced via parallel repetition. Note that our definition of soundness is non-adaptive, that is, the NO instance is fixed in advance of the random input r. Certain applications may require adaptive soundness, in which there do not exist any instance x ∈ Π NO n and valid proof π, except with negligible probability over the choice of r. For proof systems, a simple argument shows that non-adaptive soundness implies adaptive soundness error 2 −p(n) for any desired p(n) = poly(n): let B(n) = poly(n) be a bound on the length of any instance in Π NO n , and compose the proof system in parallel some poly(n) times to achieve (non-adaptive) soundness 2 −p(n)−B(n) . Then by a union bound over all x ∈ Π NO n , the resulting proof system has adaptive soundness 2 −p(n) .
Definition 2.2 (NISZK).
A noninteractive proof system (P, V ) for a promise problem Π = (Π YES , Π NO ) is statistical zero knowledge if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S (called a simulator) such that for all x ∈ Π YES , the statistical distance between S(x) and (r, P (x, r)) is negligible in n:
The class of promise problems having noninteractive statistical zero knowledge proof systems is denoted NISZK.
For defining proofs of knowledge, we adapt the general approach advocated by Bellare and Goldreich [BG92] to our noninteractive setting. In particular, the definition is entirely distinct from that of a proof system, and it refers to relations (not promise problems). Let R ⊆ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * be a binary relation where the first entry x of each (x, y) ∈ R is associated with some value of the security parameter n, and partition the relation into sub-relations R n in the natural way. Let R x = {y : (x, y) ∈ R} and Π R n = {x : ∃ y such that (x, y) ∈ R n }.
Definition 2.3 (Noninteractive proof of knowledge). Let R be a binary relation, let V be a determinstic polynomial time machine, and let κ(n), c(n) : N → [0, 1] be functions. We say that V is a knowledge verifier for the relation R with nontriviality error c and knowledge error κ if the following two conditions hold:
1. Nontriviality (with error c): there exists a probabilistic function P such that for all x ∈ Π R n , Pr[V (x, r, P (x, r)) accepts] ≥ 1 − c(n).
2. Validity (with error κ): there exists a probabilistic oracle machine E such that for for every probabilistic function P * and every x ∈ Π R n where
E P * (x) outputs a string from R x in expected time at most poly(n)/(p x − κ(n)).
The probabilities above are taken over the random input r and the random choices of P (or P * ).
Note that E is given oracle access to the prover P * , so in particular it can "rewind" P * and run it on several different random inputs r.
Lattices
For a matrix B ∈ R n×n whose columns b 1 , . . . , b n are linearly independent, the n-dimensional lattice 7 Λ generated by the basis B is
The fundamental parallelepiped of B is the half-open set
For any lattice basis B and point x ∈ R n , there is a unique vector y ∈ P(B) such that y − x ∈ L(B). This vector is denoted y = x mod B, and it can be computed in polynomial time given B and x. For any (ordered) set S = {s 1 , . . . , s n } ⊂ R n of linearly independent vectors, letS = {s 1 , . .
Let C n = {x ∈ R n : x ≤ 1} be the closed unit ball. The minimum distance of a lattice Λ, denoted λ 1 (Λ), is the length of its shortest nonzero element:
More generally, the ith successive minimum λ i (Λ) is the smallest radius r such that the closed ball rC n contains i linearly independent vectors in Λ: The covering radius µ(Λ) is the smallest radius r such that closed balls rC n centered at every point of Λ cover all of R n :
The dual lattice of Λ, denoted Λ * , is defined to be the set
of all vectors having integer inner product with all the vectors in Λ. It is routine to verify that this set is indeed a lattice, and if B is a basis for Λ, then B * = (B −1 ) T is a basis for Λ * . It also follows from the symmetry of the definition that (Λ * ) * = Λ.
Basic Facts
The various quantities above can be related to each other via so-called transference theorems, such as the following (non-trivial) result of Banaszczyk.
Lemma 2.4 ([Ban93]
). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ,
The next lemma bounds (twice) the covering radius µ from below by both the Gram-Schmidt and nth successive minima.
Lemma 2.5 ([MG02, Theorem 7.9]). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ,
The next lemma establishes that a random point in P(B) is unlikely to be "close" to the lattice, where the notion of closeness is relative to the covering radius.
Lemma 2.6 ([GMR05, Lemma 4.1]). For any lattice Λ = L(B),
where the probability is taken over t ∈ P(B) chosen uniformly at ranodm.
Problems on Lattices
Here we define some standard approximation problems on lattices, all of which ask to estimate (to within some factor γ) the value of some geometric lattice quantity. We define promise (or "gap") problems Π = (Π YES , Π NO ), where the goal is to decide whether the instance belongs to the set Π YES or the set Π NO (these two sets are disjoint, but not necessarily exhaustive; when the input belongs to neither set, any output is acceptable). In the complement of a promise problem, Π YES and Π NO are simply swapped.
Definition 2.7 (Lattice Problems). Let γ = γ(n) be an approximation factor in the dimension n. For any function φ from lattices to the positive reals, we define an approximation problem where the input is a basis B of an n-dimensional lattice.
It is a YES instance if φ(L(B)) ≤ 1, and is a NO instance if φ(L(B)) > γ(n).
In particular, we define the following concrete problems by instantiating φ:
• The Shortest Vector Problem GapSVP γ , for φ = λ 1 .
• The Shortest Independent Vectors Problem GapSIVP γ , for φ = λ n .
• The Gram-Schmidt Minimum Problem GapGSMP γ , for φ =bl.
• The Covering Radius Problem GapCRP γ , for φ = µ.
Note that the choice of the quantities 1 and γ above is arbitrary; by scaling the input instance, they can be replaced by β and β · γ (respectively) for any β > 0 without changing the problem.
Gaussians on Lattices
Our review of Gaussian measures over lattices follows the development by prior works [Reg04, AR05, MR07]. For any s > 0 define the Gaussian function centered at c with parameter s as:
The subscripts s and c are taken to be 1 and 0 (respectively) when omitted. The total measure associated to ρ s,c is x∈R n ρ s,c (x) dx = s n , so we can define a continuous Gaussian distribution centered at c with parameter s by its probability density function
It is possible to sample from D s,c efficiently to within any desired level of precision. For simplicity, we use real numbers in this work and assume that we can sample from D s,c exactly; all the arguments can be made rigorous by using a suitable degree of precision.
For any c ∈ R n , real s > 0, and lattice Λ, define the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ as:
(As above, we may omit the parameters s or c.) Note that the denominator in the above expression is always finite (see, e.g., [AR05, Claim 2.4]), so the probability distribution is well-defined. Intuitively, D Λ,s,c can be viewed as a "conditional" distribution, resulting from sampling x ∈ R n from a Gaussian centered at c with parameter s, and conditioning on the event x ∈ Λ.
The smoothing parameter. Micciancio and Regev [MR07] introduced a lattice quantity called the smoothing parameter.
Definition 2.8. For an n-dimensional lattice Λ and positive real > 0, the smoothing parameter η (Λ) is defined to be the smallest s such that ρ 1/s (Λ * \{0}) ≤ .
The name "smoothing parameter" is due to the following (informally stated) fact: if a lattice Λ is "blurred" by adding Gaussian noise with parameter s ≥ η (Λ) for some > 0, the resulting distribution is /2-close to uniform over the entire space. This is made formal in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.9 ([MR07, Lemma 4.1]).
For any lattice L(B), > 0, s ≥ η (L(B)), and c ∈ R n , the statistical distance between (D s,c mod B) and the uniform distribution over P(B) is at most /2.
The smoothing parameter of an n-dimensional lattice Λ is related to other fundamental lattice quantities, such as the dual minimum distance λ 1 (Λ * ) and the Gram-Schmidt minimumbl(Λ).
Lemma 2.10 ([MR07, Lemma 3.2]).
Let Λ be any n-dimensional lattice, and let (n) = 2 −n . Then
Lemma 2.11 ([GPV08, Lemma 3.1]). For any n-dimensional lattice Λ and > 0, we have
In particular, for any ω( √ log n) function, there is a negligible function (n) for which
Note that becausebl(Λ) ≤ λ n (Λ), we also have η (Λ) ≤ λ n (Λ) · ω( √ log n); this is Lemma 3.3 in [MR07] .
The smoothing parameter also influences the behavior of discrete Gaussian distributions over the lattice. When s ≥ η (Λ), the distribution D Λ,s,.c has a number of nice properties: it is highly concentrated within a radius s √ n around its center c, it is not concentrated too heavily in any single direction, and it is not concentrated too heavily on any fixed hyperplane. The next lemma states all these facts precisely. 
In addition, for any unit vector u ∈ R n ,
In addition, if s ≥ √ 2 · η (Λ) and H ⊂ R n is any fixed (n − 1)-dimensional hyperplane,
Noninteractive Statistical Zero Knowledge
In this section we give NISZK proof systems for a variety of standard lattice problems, as well as for a special kind of disjunction (OR) of two or more coGapSVP instances.
NISZK for Smooth-Or-Separated Problem
Here we introduce an intermediate lattice problem (actually, a family of problems parameterized by a function (n)) called SOS, which stands for "smooth-or-separated." The SOS problem exactly captures the two properties we need for our first basic NISZK proof system: in YES instances, the lattice can be completely smoothed by a Gaussian with parameter 1, and in NO instances, a random point is at least √ n away from the lattice with good probability. Moreover, the SOS problem is at least as expressive as several standard lattice problems of interest, by which we mean that there are simple (deterministic) reductions to SOS from GapSIVP γ , GapCRP γ , GapGSMP γ , and coGapSVP γ (for appropriate approximation factors γ). The NISZK proof system for SOS is described precisely in Figure 1 . For the moment, we ignore issues of efficiency and assume that the prover is unbounded (in Section 3.3 below, we describe efficient provers for specific problems of interest). To summarize, the random input is a uniformly random point t ∈ P(B), where B is the input basis. The prover samples a vector e from a Gaussian (centered at the origin), conditioned on the event that e is congruent to t modulo the lattice, i.e., e − t ∈ L(B). In other words, the prover samples from a discrete Gaussian distribution. The verifier accepts if e and t are indeed congruent modulo L(B), and if e ≤ √ n. In the YES case, the smoothing parameter is at most 1. This lets us prove that the sampled proof e is indeed shorter than √ n (with overwhelming probability), ensuring completeness. More interestingly, it means that the simulator can first choose e from a continuous Gaussian, and then set the random input t = e mod B. This t is almost-uniform in P(B), ensuring zero knowledge. In the NO case, the covering radius of the lattice is large. Therefore, with good probability the random vector t ∈ P(B) is simply too far away from the lattice to admit any short enough e, hence no proof can convince the verifier.
NISZK proof system for SOS

Common Input: A basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ = L(B).
Random Input: A vector t ∈ R n chosen uniformly at random from P(B).
Prover P : Sample v ∼ D Λ,−t , and output e = t + v ∈ R n as the proof.
Verifier V : Accept if e − t ∈ Λ and if e ≤ √ n, otherwise reject. Theorem 3.2. For any γ(n) ≥ 2 √ n and any negligible function (n), the problem -SOS γ ∈ NISZK via the proof system described in Figure 1 . The completeness error of the system is c(n) = 2 −n+1 and the soundness error is s(n) = 1/2.
Proof. We demonstrate each of the required properties in turn.
Completeness. Suppose that B is a YES instance of -SOS γ , i.e., η (Λ) ≤ 1. By construction, v ∈ Λ because the support of D Λ,−t is Λ. Therefore e − t = v ∈ Λ. Furthermore, by Lemma 2.12, we have
except with probability at most
, which is therefore an upper bound on the completeness error.
Soundness. Suppose that B is a NO instance of -SOS γ , i.e., µ(Λ) > γ(n) ≥ 2 √ n. For the verifier to accept, it must be that e ≤ √ n and t − e ∈ Λ, which implies
However, by Lemma 2.6, the probability (over the choice of t ∈ P(B)) of this event is at most 1/2, which is therefore an upper bound on the soundness error.
Statistical zero knowledge. The simulator S algorithm does the following: choose e ∼ D from the continuous Gaussian distribution (centered at 0 with parameter 1) and compute t = e mod B.
Output (t , e ).
We now analyze the statistical distance between the distribution of the simulator's output (t , e ) and the distribution of (t, e) in the real protocol. By definition, the distribution of v = e − t conditioned on any fixed value of t ∈ P(B) is exactly D Λ,−t . In the simulation, consider the distribution D of v = e − t conditioned on any fixed value of t ∈ P(B). The support of D is Λ, and the distribution is
Therefore for anyt ∈ P(B), the distribution of the simulated proof e conditioned on t =t is identical to the distribution of the real proof e conditioned on t =t. Now because B is a YES instance of -SOS γ , we have η (Λ) ≤ 1. By Lemma 2.9, the random input t generated by the simulator is within negligible statistical distance (n)/2 of uniform over P(B), which is the distribution of t in the real system. It follows that ∆((e, t), (e , t )) ≤ (n)/2, as desired.
We now turn to the knowledge guarantee for the protocol. For a function = (n), we define a relation R where an instance (for security parameter n) is a basis B ⊂ R n×n of a lattice having smoothing parameter bounded by 1 (without loss of generality), and a witness for B is a full-rank set S ⊂ L(B) of lattice vectors having length at most 2 √ n. Formally,
, and S ≤ 2 √ n}.
Theorem 3.3. For any positive (n) ≤ 1/3, the verifier described in Figure 1 is a knowledge verifier for relation R with nontriviality error c(n) = 2 −n+1 and knowledge error κ(n) = (n)/2.
Proof. The nontriviality error follows directly from the completeness property as shown in the proof of Theorem 3.2. Let B ∈ Π R n and Λ = L(B), and suppose that for some P * ,
where the probability is taken over a uniformly random t ∈ P(B) and the randomness of P * .
The extractor E, on input B and given oracle access to P * , works as follows. Start with an empty set S, and repeat the following: choose e ∼ D 1 and compute t = e mod B. Run the prover P * on (B, t ). If the prover produces an e such that e ≤ √ n and e = t mod B (i.e., an e such that V (B, t , e) accepts), and if s = e − e ∈ Λ is linearly independent from the vectors in S and s ≤ 2 √ n, then add s to S. If |S| = n, output S, otherwise loop.
We now analyze E. First, note that because B ∈ Π R n , we have η (Λ) ≤ 1. Therefore, each random input t produced by E is within statistical distance κ(n) = (n)/2 of uniform over P(B), by Lemma 2.9. Thus, P * produces a valid proof with probability at least p B − κ(n) over the extractor's choice of t and the randomness of P * . Now condition on the event that P * produces an accepting proof e. First, it can be seen that the distribution of s = e − e is exactly the discrete Gaussian D Λ,s,−e . By the fact that e ≤ √ n, the triangle inequality, and Lemma 2.12, we have s ≤ (e − e) − (−e) + e ≤ 2 √ n, except with probability at most 2 −n+1 . Moreover, the probability that s lands in any fixed n − 1 dimensional subspace of R n is at most 9/10 by Lemma 2.12. If follows that with each iteration, the probability that we add a new vector to S is at least (p B − κ(n))/20. We conclude that the expected number of iterations before |S| = n is O(n)/(p B − κ(n)), and the proof is complete.
Standard Lattice Problems
We now show straightforward deterministic reductions from the standard lattice problems GapSIVP γ , GapCRP γ and coGapSVP γ to the -SOS γ problem, for appropriate approximation factors γ (n) related to γ(n) (and some negligible function (n)).
Theorem 3.4. For every γ(n) ≥ 1 and any fixed ω( √ log n) function, there is a deterministic polynomial-time reduction from each of the following problems to -SOS γ (for some negligible function (n)):
• GapSIVP γ , GapCRP γ , and GapGSMP γ for any γ (n) ≥ 2ω( √ log n) · γ(n),
In particular, the problems GapSIVP γ , GapCRP γ , and GapGSMP γ for γ (n) = ω( √ n log n) and coGapSVP 4n are in NISZK.
Proof. The "in particular" part of the claim follows by Theorem 3.2, which gives an NISZK proof system for -SOS γ for any γ(n) ≥ 2 √ n. First consider GapSIVP γ . The reduction is the trivial one that on input B outputs B. Without loss of generality, we can assume (by scaling) that for YES instances B of GapSIVP γ , the lattice Λ = L(B) has λ n (Λ) ≤ 1/ω( √ log n), while NO instances are such that λ n (Λ) > 2γ(n). Suppose that B is a YES instance. By Lemma 2.11, there is a negligible function (n) such that η (Λ) ≤ 1, and thus B is a YES instance of -SOS γ . Now suppose that B is a NO instance. Then by Lemma 2.5, µ(Λ) ≥ λ n (Λ)/2 > γ(n), and B is a NO instances of -SOS γ . The reduction and analysis for GapGSMP γ is identical, with λ n replaced bybl.
The reduction from GapCRP γ is likewise the trivial reduction. Without loss of generality, we can assume that for YES instances B of GapCRP γ , the lattice Λ = L(B) has µ(Λ) ≤ 1/(2ω( √ log n)), while NO instances are such that µ(Λ) > γ(n). For a YES instance, by Lemma 2.5 and 2.11, there is a negligible function (n) such that η (Λ) ≤ 1, and thus B is a YES instance of -SOS γ . Now if B is a NO instance of GapCRP γ , then we have already seen that µ(Λ) > γ(n), and B is a NO instances of -SOS γ as desired.
The reduction from coGapSVP γ is almost as trivial: on input basis B output the basis B * = (B −1 ) T of the dual lattice Λ * = L(B * ). Without loss of generality, we can assume that YES instances (of coGapSVP γ ) are such that λ 1 (Λ) ≥ √ n, while NO instances are such that λ 1 (Λ) < 1/(2γ(n)). For a YES instance, we have η (Λ * ) ≤ √ n/λ 1 (Λ) ≤ 1 for (n) = 2 −n by Lemma 2.10, so B * is a YES instance of -SOS γ . For a NO instance, we have µ(Λ * ) ≥ 1/(2λ 1 (Λ)) > γ(n) by Lemma 2.4, so B * is a NO instance of -SOS γ , as desired.
Prover Efficiency
We now show an efficient implementation of the prover strategy from the proof system of Figure 1 , given some appropriate auxiliary information about the lattice Λ. Note that the prover has to sample from the discrete Gaussian distribution D Λ,−t (with parameter 1). For this purpose, we use a recent result of Gentry, Peikert and Vaikuntanathan [GPV08] . Corollary 3.6. The problems GapSIVP ω( √ n log n) , GapCRP ω( √ n log n) , and coGapSVP ω(n 1.5 √ log n) admit NISZK proof systems with efficient prover algorithms.
Proof. By the reductions from the proof of Theorem 3.4, GapSIVP ω( √ n log n) and GapCRP ω( √ n log n)
reduce to -SOS 2 √ n (for some negligible (n)), which has an NISZK proof system as described in Figure 1 . It simply remains to show that the prover algorithm from that system can be implemented by an efficient algorithm with suitable auxiliary input. As we have seen in the proof of Theorem 3.4, the YES instances B for both GapSIVP and GapCRP have λ n (L(B)) ≤ 1/ω( √ log n). Using a basis B such that B ≤ 1/ω( √ log n) as the auxiliary input, an efficient prover can use the SampleD algorithm claimed in Proposition 3.5 to sample from a distribution that is statistically close to D L(B),−t for any t. Because the distributions are statistically close, the completeness, soundness, and knowledge errors of the efficient-prover system are negligibly close to those of the original (unbounded-prover) system.
For coGapSVP ω(n 1.5 √ log n) , by Lemmas 2.4 and 2.5 we have a reduction to GapSIVP ω( √ n log n)
that maps B to B * . The claim then follows from the results we have already shown.
Tighter Factors for coGapSVP
Theorem 3.4 and Corollary 3.6 establish that GapSIVP γ and GapCRP γ are in NISZK, and even have efficient provers, for any γ(n) = ω( √ n log n). On the other hand, for coGapSVP they give NISZK proof systems only for γ(n) ≥ 4n; for an efficient prover, the factor γ(n) = ω(n 1.5 log n) is looser still.
Here we give a more sophisticated NISZK proof system specifically for coGapSVP γ . With an unbounded prover, the approximation factor is some γ(n) = O( √ n); with an efficient prover it can be any γ(n) = ω(n √ log n). Interestingly, we can also give an efficient quantum prover for any γ(n) = O(n/ √ log n), which is an ω(log n) factor tighter than the classical factor. (Note that the auxiliary input and proof system are still entirely classical; only the internal prover algorithm itself is quantum.) NISZK proof system for coGapSVP Common Input: A basis B of an n-dimensional lattice Λ = L(B). Let N = 10n 3 log n.
Random Input: Vectors t 1 , . . . , t N ∈ P(B * ) chosen independently and uniformly at random from P(B * ), defining the matrix T ∈ (P(B * )) N ⊂ R n×N .
Prover P : For each i ∈ [N ], choose v i ∼ D Λ * ,−t i , and let e i = t i + v i . The proof is the matrix E ∈ R n×N .
Verifier V : Accept if both of the following conditions hold, otherwise reject:
1. e i − t i ∈ Λ * for all i ∈ [N ], and 2. All the eigenvalues of the n × n positive semidefinite matrix EE T are at most 3N . Theorem 3.7. For any γ(n) ≥ 20 √ n, the problem coGapSVP γ is in NISZK, via the proof system described in Figure 2 .
Furthermore, for any γ(n) ≥ ω(n √ log n), the prover can be implemented efficiently with an appropriate succinct witness. For any γ(n) ≥ n/ √ log n, the prover can be implemented efficiently as a quantum algorithm with a succinct classical witness.
Proof. We analyze the proof system and prove each of the required properties. Without loss of generality, we can assume (by scaling) that YES instances of coGapSVP are such that λ 1 (Λ) > √ n, while NO instances are such that λ 1 (Λ) ≤ 1/20.
Statistical zero knowledge.
(This property is the easiest to demonstrate, so we dispense with it first.) The prover strategy on input B is exactly the prover strategy for -SOS on input B * (Figure 1 ), run N times in parallel using the independent random t i ∈ P(B * ) as random inputs. Therefore, we can simply run the simulator S from the proof of Theorem 3.2 on input B * in parallel N times. It simply remains to ensure that B * is a YES instance of -SOS for some negligible (n). Indeed, when B is a YES instance, we have λ 1 (Λ) > √ n, which by Lemma 2.10 implies η (Λ * ) ≤ 1 for (n) = 2 −n .
Completeness and prover efficiency. Suppose B is a YES instance. Because λ 1 (Λ) > √ n, we have η (Λ * ) ≤ 1 for = 2 −n by Lemma 2.10. By definition of P , e i − t i = v i ∈ Λ * for all i ∈ [N ], so it remains to show that Test 2 is satisfied with significant probability. This fact is (almost) proved in [AR05, Lemma 6.2], where it is shown that all the eigenvalues of the matrix EE T are at most 3N (except with probability 2 −Ω(n) ) if every column e i is chosen independently according to D Λ * . In our case, the columns are distributed as t + D Λ * ,−t , where η (Λ * ) ≤ 1. The proof of [AR05, Lemma 6.2] carries through even when each column e i is chosen according to a different distribution, as long as all of the distributions satisfy the two hypotheses of that lemma. Indeed, Lemma 2.12 establishes these hypotheses for the distribution t + D Λ * ,−t . It follows that our proof system has completeness error 2 −Ω(n) , as desired.
For the efficient classical prover, we have λ 1 (Λ) > ω(n √ log n), so λ n (Λ * ) ≤ 1/ω( √ log n) by Lemma 2.4. Therefore there is a sufficiently short full-rank set S ⊂ Λ * that enables efficient sampling from D Λ * ,c (Proposition 3.5). For the efficient quantum prover, we combine techniques from [Reg05] and [LLM06] . This involves generating a quantum state corresponding to the Fourier transform of D Λ * ,c by using the algorithm of [LLM06] to decode points that are within distance √ n ≤ λ 1 (Λ) · log n/n of Λ. As in [Reg05] , we then compute the quantum Fourier transform and take a measurement, thus yielding a sample from D Λ * ,c . We defer the details.
Soundness. Suppose that B is a NO instance, i.e., λ 1 (Λ) ≤ 1/20. Consider the set of all random inputs T for which the verifier may be fooled into accepting, i.e.,
We show that Pr T [T ∈ BAD] ≤ 2 −N , which establishes an exponentially-small soundness error. Let T ∈ BAD, E be such that V (B, T, E) accepts. Let v 1 , . . . , v n be an orthonormal eigenvector basis of EE T (which exists because EE T is positive semidefinite). Then because Test 2 is passed, for all i ∈ [n] we have EE T v i = κ i v i for some 0 ≤ κ i ≤ 3N . For any x ∈ R n , we may write x = i∈[n] c i v i ∈ R n for some coefficients c i ∈ R, hence x 2 = i c 2 i . Furthermore, we have
In particular, if x ∈ Λ = L(B) is a shortest nonzero vector in Λ, i.e., x = λ 1 (Λ) ≤ 1/20, then E T x ≤ √ N /10. Now because Test 1 is passed, we have t i − e i ∈ Λ * for each i ∈ [N ]. Because x ∈ Λ, we have
Thus, T T x = E T x mod 1, i.e., corresponding entries are congruent modulo 1. Now because E T x ∈ C N √ N /10 (recall that C N is the closed unit ball in R N ), we have established that if
We now bound the probability that Equation (3.1) holds over the random choice of T ∈ (P(B * )) N . First we show that for any fixed nonzero x ∈ Λ (and in particular, for the x defined above), T T x mod 1 is uniformly random in [0, 1) N . To see this, let x = Bz for some nonzero z ∈ Z n , and observe that for each i ∈ [N ], t i = B * u i for uniformly random and independent u i ∈ [0, 1) n . Then 
where the inequality follows by Stirling's approximation Γ(k + 1) = k! ≥ (k/e) k . This completes the proof.
NISZK for a Special Disjunction Language
Here we demonstrate a NISZK proof system for a special language that is structurally similar to the disjunction of many coGapSVP γ instances. For simplicity, we abuse notation and identify lattices with their arbitrary bases (e.g., as problem instances or inputs to algorithms).
Definition 3.8. For a prime q, an input to OR-coGapSVP k q,γ is an n-dimensional lattice Λ such that λ 1 (Λ) > γ(n), and k superlattices Λ j ⊃ Λ for j ∈ [k] such that the quotient groups Λ * /Λ * j are all isomorphic to the additive group G = Z q .
It is a YES instance if λ 1 (Λ i ) > γ(n) for some i ∈ [k], and is a NO instance if λ 1 (Λ i ) ≤ 1 for
We present an NISZK proof system for OR-coGapSVP 2 q,γ in Figure 3 . The proof and its analysis generalize to any k > 2 with moderate changes (mainly, the √ q factors in the statement of Theorem 3.9 become q (k−1)/k factors).
Theorem 3.9. Let q ≥ 100 be prime and let γ(n) ≥ 40 √ qn. Then the protocol in Figure 3 is a NISZK proof system for OR-coGapSVP 2 q,γ . Furthermore, if γ(n) ≥ 40 √ q ·ω(n √ log n), then the oracles used by the prover can be implemented efficiently with appropriate succinct witnesses.
Proof sketch. By scaling, we can say that YES instances have λ 1 (Λ), λ 1 (Λ j ) > √ n for some j ∈ {1, 2}, while NO instances have λ 1 (Λ j ) ≤ 1/40 √ q for all j ∈ {1, 2}. For the second part of the claim, we can assume that YES instances have λ 1 (Λ), λ 1 (Λ j ) > ω(n √ log n). Completeness is relatively straightforward to show. Briefly, for some j ∈ {1, 2} we have η (Λ * ), η (Λ * j ) ≤ 1 for = 2 −n , by Lemma 2.10. For the second part of the claim, by Lemma 2.4 we have λ n (Λ * ), λ n (Λ * j ) ≤ 1/ω( √ log n), so there are short full-rank sets S ⊂ Λ * , S j ⊂ Λ * j that enable efficient sampling from discrete Gaussians over Λ * and Λ * j (Proposition 3.5). As we showed in the proof of Theorem 3.7, the matrices E j satisfy the eigenvalue test with overwhelming probability.
For statistical zero knowledge, the simulator does the following for each i ∈ [N ] (we elide the subscript i in the following): for j ∈ {1, 2}, it chooses e j ∼ D (the continuous Gaussian with parameter 1 centered at 0) independently and computes t j = e j mod Λ * j . It then computes g j = (e j − t j mod Λ * j ) ∈ G, and sets s = g 1 + g 2 ∈ G. The simulated random input and proof are as in the proof system. Essentially, statistical zero knowledge follows because the t j ∈ P(Λ * ) are (statistically) uniform and independent. Furthermore, for YES instances, at least one of g 1 , g 2 is uniformly random in G (statistically) conditioned on any fixed values of t 1 , t 2 .
The proof of soundness is more involved. Suppose we have a NO instance. We will show that the fraction of random inputs for which there exists some valid proof is 2 −N . For each j ∈ {1, 2}, and let x j be a shortest nonzero vector in Λ j , so x ≤ 1/40 √ q. If the verifier accepts, then as in the proof of Theorem 3.7, we have where the columns of G j ∈ G N are made up of the N group elements g j ∈ G as in the verifier algorithm.
NISZK proof system for OR-coGapSVP 2 q,γ
Common Input: Lattices Λ, Λ 1 , Λ 2 of dimension n as in Definition 3.8. Let N = 10n 3 log n.
Random Input: Matrices T 1 , T 2 ∈ (P(Λ * )) N and group elements s 1 , . . . , s N ∈ G = Z q chosen independently and uniformly at random.
Prover P : Recall that λ 1 (Λ) > γ(n), and without loss of generality assume that λ 1 (Λ 1 ) > γ(n) (the other case is symmetric).
The auxiliary input to the prover is an oracle O (or its equivalent) that samples from D Λ * ,c for any given c ∈ R n , and an oracle O 1 for sampling from D Λ * 1 ,c . Do the following for each i ∈ [N ] (for clarity, we omit the subscript i on all vectors):
1. Let e 2 ← t 2 + D Λ * ,−t 2 , and let g 2 = (e 2 − t 2 mod Λ * 2 ) ∈ (Λ * /Λ * 2 ) = G. 2. Let g 1 = s − g 2 ∈ G = (Λ * /Λ * 1 ), and compute the unique t 1 ∈ P(Λ * 1 ) such that t 1 = t 1 mod Λ * and (t 1 − t 1 mod Λ * 1 ) = g 1 ∈ (Λ * /Λ * 1 ). 3. Let e 1 ← t 1 + D Λ * 1 ,−t 1 . The proof consists of the matrices E 1 , E 2 ∈ R n×N (whose N columns are the e 1 and e 2 vectors, respectively, constructed above for each i ∈ [N ]).
Verifier V : Accept if all of the following conditions hold, otherwise reject.
• All the eigenvalues of both E 1 E T 1 and E 2 E T 2 are at most 3N .
• For every i ∈ [N ] (again eliding the subscripts i), e 1 = t 1 mod Λ * and e 2 = t 2 mod Λ * and g 1 + g 2 = s ∈ G, where g j = (e j − t j mod Λ * j ) ∈ (Λ * /Λ * j ) = G for j = 1, 2. Define the discrete additive subgroup H ⊂ [0, 1) n as H = Λ * , x j mod 1 (i.e., the inner product of every vector in Λ * with x j ). Because the inner product with x j is a group homomorphism and x j ∈ Λ j , x j ∈ Λ, H is a nontrivial subgroup of G = Z q , hence it is isomorphic to Z q . Now G T j x j ∈ H N , and by (3.2), it must be within radius N/400q (modulo 1) of −T T j x j . Our goal will be to bound the number of possible values of G T j x j ∈ H N . Consider all the points of H N within a radius of N/400q of −T T j x j . If we center cubes with (axis-parallel) edges of length 1/q at all K such points, then by the triangle inequality, all the cubes lie within a ball of radius N/400q + √ N /2q ≤ N/100q around −T T j x j modulo 1. Then we have K ≤ q N · vol(C N N/100q) = (N q/100) N/2 · vol(C N ) ≤ (q/2) N/2 . Now if the verifier accepts, there are at most K 2 ≤ (q/2) N possible values for (G T 1 x 1 , G T 2 x 2 ) ∈ H 2N . Because the homomorphism from (Λ * /Λ * j ) = Z q to H is actually an isomorphism, we conclude that (for any fixed values of T j ) there are at most (q/2) N possible values of the group elements (s 1 , . . . , s N ) ∈ Z n q for which the verifier may mistakenly accept. Therefore the probability that the random input lands on one of these value is at most 2 −N , and we are done.
